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ment or in favor of the person seeking corporate control
)1!00
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Mosinee Paper Corp.
v. Rondeau, and in all likelihood will decide the case in 1975.01 More-
over, the Second Circuit's damage award in Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. will most assuredly be contested." 2 Hope-
fully the resolution of these two cases will end the era of the pro forma
injunction while providing a responsible formula to calculate dam-
ages in the tender offer situation.*
VI. GOING PRIVATE - A PUBLIC CONCERN
During the past year a number of small and medium sized corpo-
rations have repurchased their outstanding shares for the purpose of
"going private."' Such repurchases reduce the number of the corpora-
tion's shares and centralize ownership in fewer shareholders.2 The
motivation for going private may be the elimination of unwanted
minority shareholders,' freedom from the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws,4 or simply self-investment because of cur-
rently reduced stock prices.' Although the concept of reducing the
11 500 F.2d at 1020, quoting GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 n.6 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
101 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1974).
102 BANGOR PUNTA CORP., REPORT FOR Six MoNTHs ENDING MARCH 31, 1975. Bangor
Punta management assured its shareholders that every avenue would be explored in
an attempt to reverse or substantially modify the damage award.
* The Supreme Court reversed Mosinee Paper, stating that the securities laws
were not meant to provide incumbent management with a tool to maintain corporate
control. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., - U.S. , 95 S.Ct. 2069, 2067 (1975).
1 See Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation - Going Private, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 5, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Kerr, Tender Offers and Going Private - Ending Public
Shareholding an Issue, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 25, col. 3; Kessler, Elimination of
Minority Interests by Cash Merger: Two Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAw. 699 (1975); Note,
Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
Stone, A Corporation's Repurchase of Its Own Shares, 49 LAB BULL. 106 (1974).
3 See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -
U.S. - 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974). The controlling shareholders, direc-
tors and officers attempted to buy out the plaintiff's interest in the corporation. When
he refused to sell, a scheme was created to divest him of his interest through use of
the merger provisions of the state corporation law.
'See Kaufman v. Lawrence, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
1974). The company involved made an exchange offer to its shareholders to reduce
their number sufficiently to avoid the federal securities laws registration requirements.
See note 11 infra.
I See Broder v. Dane, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,875 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1974).
Controlling shareholders and directors made an exchange offer to public shareholders
to tender back shares at a price significantly above the current market price, yet
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public holding of shares is not new,' the recent increase in the number
of such transactions and the potential abuse of the rights of minority
shareholders has caused a wave of litigation involving going private.'
The increase in the number of companies going private is perhaps
a natural result of the many new public offerings which occurred
during the prosperous late 1960's and early 1970's.8 When these com-
panies went public, investors purchased not only a present interest
in the enterprise, but also a speculative interest in the future prosper-
ity of the company In all likelihood the offerings were subject to the
registration requirements of the Securities Act," and the companies
involved became subject to the reporting requirements of the Ex-
change Act."
With the decline in market prices it has become profitable for
companies to reacquire their securities, usually at a fraction of the
price at which they were issued. 2 Moreover, if the total number of
substantially below -the price at which the securities were originally sold.
I See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 675 (1942). See generally Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stock-
holder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1189 (1964).
' Address by Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., Notre Dame Law Advisory Coun-
cil Lecture, Nov. 14, 1974, (reprinted at CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,010 [hereinafter
cited as Address by Commissioner Sommer]). Commissioner Sommer stated that the
elimination of private interests in the going private transactions are both immoral and
illegal. The Commissioner urged the courts to take an active role using the securities
laws to regulate these activities. See also, Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation
- Going Private, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Kerr, Tender Offers and Going
Private - Ending Public Shareholding an Issue, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 25, col. 3.
8 See note 12 infra.
0 Cf. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right,
77 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1201-02 (1964); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy:
An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 231-32 (1962).
"1 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities
Act].
it Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a), 15 U. S.C. § 781(a) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Exchange Act], provides for registration by the issuer of any security traded
on a national exchange. Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (1970), provides
generally for the registration by the issuer of securities traded in, or through the
instrumentalities of, interstate commerce where the issuer has total assets in excess of
$1,000,000 and a class of equity security held by more than 500 persons.
'2 See, e.g., Kaufman v. Lawrence, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 1974). The company was organized in 1966. When the first public offering was
made in 1968, the public invested $7,173,250 of which the officers and directors netted
$5,866,370 in return for their share of the corporation sold to the public. A second
public offering was made in 1971 in which the public invested $7,258,823.25, and the
directors realized $6,841,649. The company prospered briefly; its common stock sold
for a high of 27-7/8 in 1972, but dropped to 5- 2 prior to the exchange offer in September
of 1974. The exchange offer by management provided for $3 in cash and $8 principal
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shareholders of a company reporting under the Exchange Act is re-
duced below 300, the company is no longer subject to the reporting
requirements of that Act.'3 This eliminates the burdens of the federal
filing requirements on the company as well as the shareholder protec-
tions afforded by the disclosure requirements.' 4 Further, the com-
pany's shares may be delisted or no longer traded over the counter,
thereby freeing the company from compliance with other sections of
the federal securities laws, 5 and greatly reducing the shareholder's
investment liquidity.
A company may go private in various ways. It may attempt to
acquire outstanding shares by soliciting a voluntary tender back to
the company by the shareholders. This may take the form of a cash
tender offer'7 or an exchange offer of a debt security for outstanding
amount of 10% subordinated sinking fund debentures maturing in 1984. The deben-
tures were limited to an aggregate principal amount of $11,240,064. Effectively the
officers and directors were able to repurchase those shares sold to the public at a
"fraction of the original cost to the public shareholders." Id. at 97,092.
'3 Exchange Act § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (4) (1970).
" The general philosophy of the federal securities laws has been that a balance
between protection of the investor and minimum government interference in the secur-
ities market can best be struck through requiring full disclosure of relevant data by
the issuer, thus allowing the investor to make an informed decision on his investments.
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 110 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1940). See generally
Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340 (1966); Douglas &
Bates, The Federal Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); Heller, Disclosure Require-
ments Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAw. 300 (1961); Kripke, The
SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths And Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1151
(1970).
15 Securities registered on a national exchange and registered with the Commis-
sion pursuant to Exchange Act § 12(a) may be relieved from further compliance with
the federal registration requirements upon application by the issuer to the Commission
when such stock has been withdrawn from the exchange. Exchange Act § 12(d), 15
U.S.C. § 781(d) (1970).
" Liquidity of investment, the ability to sell at will, is one of the prime motiva-
tions to invest in a public corporation, especially when the security purchased is listed
on one of the stock exchanges or traded on the over-the-counter market. In those cases
the investor is assured of finding a ready purchaser for his holdings should he desire
to sell. However, when a corporation goes private and its shares are withdrawn from
the exchange or the over-the-counter market, the ability of the stockholder to sell his
interest decreases. As the ownership of the corporation becomes more concentrated,
the market for shares in the corporation contracts. See Kaufman v. Lawrence, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974); Broder v. Dane, CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,875 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1974); Address by Commissioner Sommer, supra
note 7, at 84,695-96.
11 In a cash tender offer the company offers holders of its securities a premium
price for their holdings. Cf. Kaufman v. Lawrence, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974). See generally V TENDER OFFER, supra.
1975]
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shares, as in Broder v. Dane.8 In Broder the controlling shareholders
and management of the company held 70 percent of the outstanding
stock, while the remaining 30 percent was held by public investors.
The majority shareholders invited a tender back by the public share-
holders in exchange for nonconvertible subordinated debentures."
While termed a "voluntary" going private, the coercive impact on the
shareholder to tender his shares is apparent. Although the share-
holder in Broder was not compelled to tender, the stock was subject
to delisting and by refusing to tender his shares the stockholder faced
ownership of stock with potentially glacial liquidity.2"
Stronger measures are available to eliminate minority sharehold-
ers against their will. An "involuntary freezeout" may take the form
of a reverse stock split,21 a cash merger, 22 or a short form merger.2
Under any of these methods the majority can effectively eliminate the
minority shareholders' interest in the company, leaving a former
shareholder with only cash. 24 Regardless of whether "voluntary" or
"involuntary" methods are used to eliminate minority shareholders,
the exclusion of minority shareholders by going private presents ques-
tions of corporate responsibility ripe for resolution under either fed-
eral or state law, or both.
2 5
," CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,875 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1974).
,1 Id. at 96,988.
21 See note 16 supra.
1, If the majority shareholders hold a sufficient number of shares they may call
for a reverse stock split of bizarre proportions. In states that prohibit fractional shares
all shareholders who have less than the amount of shares called for in a reverse will be
forced to accept cash for their investment. See North Central Co. 's Plans a 1-for-500
Reverse Split, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1974, at 16, col. 4.
= In the typical cash merger situation the corporation is merged into a second
corporation in which the majority also has a controlling interest. The majority share-
holders are thus able to retain control of the original corporation through their control
of the second. The minority shareholders are, however, forced to accept cash for their
investment. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
__ U.S. -,43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin
& Jenrette, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,722 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 1974).
2 When permitted under state law, see, e.g., DEL. CoRp. L. ANN. § 243 (1973), a
parent corporation which owns a specified percentage of a subsidiary, usually 90%,
may merge the subsidiary into the parent without a vote of the minority shareholders
of the subsidiary corporation, and simply pay the subsidiary's minority shareholders
the fair market value of their investment. Therefore, a majority group which holds the
requisite percentage may transfer all of its holdings to a dummy corporation created
solely for the merger and merge the original corporation into the dummy. See Levine
v. Biddle Sawyer Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 94,816 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1974).
24 See generally Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Ap-
praisal Right, 77 HARV. L. Rev. 1189 (1964).
See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
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Use of the federal securities laws to regulate going private transac-
tions was proposed in a speech by SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer,
Jr.2" The Commissioner suggested that the elimination of minority
shareholders was subject to the antifraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act.Y He reasoned that when a corporation goes public
and solicits capital from the investing public it makes an implied
promise to protect the shareholder's interest and that, "absent the
most compelling business justification," it will do nothing to interfere
with the liquidity of the investment." Thus, he contended that Rule
10b-5 places a quasi-fiduciary responsibility on the management and
majority shareholders of public corporations, and absent a compel-
ling business purpose, the elimination of minority shareholders in
going private transactions is a violation of this duty.
29
However, the courts that have considered going private transac-
tions have not agreed with Commissioner Sommer's analysis. These
courts have noted that the securities laws merely require full and fair
disclosure,3 and have therefore examined only the sufficiency of the
disclosure. 3' In none of the cases did the court examine the justifica-
tion for the transaction under Commissioner Sommer's quasi-
fiduciary responsibility theory.
32
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation - Going
Private, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Address by Commissioner Sommer, supra
note 7.
25 Address by Commissioner Sommer, supra note 7.
7 Id. at 84,698.
23 Id.
" Id. See also, Loomis, Greater Activism and Adaption by the SEC, 29 Bus. LAW.
115 (Special Issue 1974) (recommending expansive use of antifraud provisions to con-
trol corporate activity).
10 See Kaufman v. Lawrence, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908, at 97,093 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 1974) (§ 10(b) and § 14(e) of the Exchange Act are satisfied by full and fair
disclosure); Broder v. Dane, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,875, at 96,989-90 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 1974) (§ 14(e) demands only full and fair disclosure for the benefit of inves-
tors); Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 362 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D. Del.
1973) (proxy solicitation requirements of § 14(e) are satisfied by full disclosure of
relevant information).
31 Compare Broder v. Dane, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,875 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
1974) (sufficient evidence of material omissions in tender offer statements in violation
of § 14(e) to justify a temporary injunction until supplemental statement issued which
will fully inform shareholders of information relevant to the tender offer) with Kauf-
man v. Lawrence, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974) (no injunc-
tion may issue under § 14(e) when full disclosure of relevant information made).
3 Cf. Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 362 F. Supp. 771 (D. Del.
1973). In analyzing the duties of directors and shareholders the court stated:
Although it is clear that the 1934 Act creates fiduciary relationships
19751
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In Kaufman v. Lawrence3 the federal court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York considered an exchange offer made by Wells, Rich,
Greene, Inc. in an effort to go private. The company involved was one
of those which had gone public in the late sixties, and by taking
advantage of the depressed market it was able to free itself from
federal regulation and eliminate public shareholders for a fraction of
the new issue price. 4 After determining that the prospectus accompa-
nying the tender offer disclosed all material facts, the district court
refused to enjoin the transaction. Judge Carter summarized the diffi-
culty confronting the courts in attempting to impose fiduciary obliga-
tions on corporations under the federal securities laws:
[T]here is nothing invalid per se in a corporate effort to free
itself from federal regulations, provided the means and the
methods used to effectuate that objective are allowable under
the law. Nor has the federal securities law placed profit-
making or shrewd business tactics designed to benefit insiders
• . . beyond the pale ...
A public company going "private" may indeed raise serious
questions concerning protection of the public interest. There
is, however, no foundation on the record before me from which
the ramifications of that interest within reach of the federal
securities laws might conceivably be explored.n
The apparent inability of the federal securities laws to reach going
private transactions has led several courts to analyze the problem on
the basis of state law. In Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co.38 majority
shareholders attempted to force a minority shareholder out of the
corporation through use of the state merger statute. The Fifth Circuit
found that the proposed merger was a sham, undertaken solely to
eliminate the shareholder. 3 Using an analysis similar to Commis-
and obligations of corporate directors and establishes a separate and
distinct substantive federal law .. , the Act does so only in the areas
it purports to regulate.
362 F. Supp. at 775.
13 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974).
3 See note 12 supra.
31 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908, at 97,093.
490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. , 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S.
Oct. 15, 1974).
17 The plaintiff alleged various violations of the federal securities laws, including
a charge that the proposed merger was a device or scheme or defraud investors in
violation of Rule 10b-5. Although the Fifth Circuit did not consider the federal claim,
it asserted jurisdiction over the state claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
Id. at 565, 571.
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sioner Sommer's, the court found that the merger was not compelled
by a "legitimate business purpose" and therefore was in violation of
the state's corporation law. 8 Perhaps the most significant aspect of
the Bryan "business purpose" requirement is that the state statute'
construed by the Fifth Circuit is based upon the New York merger
statute." If courts construe the New York statute similarly, a signifi-
cant precedent will be set, at least insofar as sham mergers are used
to deprive minority shareholders of their interests.
The imposition of a fiduciary obligation on the majority share-
holders to protect the interests of minority shareholders has afforded
the minority shareholders even greater protection than the "business
purpose" requirement in Bryan. In Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co.4"
the California Supreme Court considered a marketing scheme cre-
ated by the controlling shareholders of a corporation to benefit their
holdings at the expense of the minority shareholders. Chief Justice
Traynor stated:
Majority shareholders may not use their power to control cor-
porate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner
detrimental to the minority. Any use to which they put the
corporation or their power to control the corporation must ben-
efit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict with
the proper conduct of the corporation's business.42
This approach places upon those who control corporations the same
broad fiduciary responsibility under state law which Commissioner
Sommer suggested the federal securities laws impose. Unlike the
"business purpose" approach of Bryan, which considers only the mo-
tive behind a merger eliminating minority interests, Chief Justice
Traynor's theory places upon the majority shareholders an ongoing
fiduciary duty to protect minority interests.43 Under this rationale
courts conceivably may examine the fairness of any transaction,
Is Id. at 571. The Northern District of Florida adopted the "business purpose"
principle in justifying a merger under Florida corporation law. Grimes v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenerette, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,722 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 1974).
" GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1001 to 22-1008 (1970).
" N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 263 (McKinney 1968).
" 1 Cal. 3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969).
42 1 Cal. 3d at 108, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 599, 460 P.2d at 471.
13 Chief Justice Traynor noted that the increasingly complex nature of commercial
and corporate transactions necessitates the expansion of fiduciary principles to protect
minority shareholders, especially in small and closely held corporations where poten-'
tial abuse by controlling shareholders is acute. 1 Cal. 3d at 111-12, 81 Cal. Rptr. at
601-02, 460 P.2d at 472-74.
19751
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whether voluntary or involuntary, which eliminates minority inter-
ests.
The "business purpose" approach used in Bryan and the "fidu-
ciary responsibility" imposed on the majority shareholders in
Ahmanson provide appealing methods of protecting minority share-
holder interests in going private transactions." However, the lack of
uniformity of state corporation law indicates that neither theory is
likely to gain universal application. 5 Also, states generally have been
hesitant to impose a fiduciary responsibility on majority shareholders
and, moreover, have been unsympathetic toward the precarious in-
vestment position of the minority shareholder.46
The absence of adequate federal protection for the minority share-
holder and the failure of most states to protect his interest from abuse
has led to urgings that federal law be expanded, either judicially or
legislatively, to cover going private situations." Suggested ap-
proaches range from Commissioner Sommer's application of the Rule
10b-5 antifraud provisions" to the enactment of "federal fiduciary
standards."49 Although courts have declined so far to require more
" See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Take-overs,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974). In this article the authors discuss parent-subsidiary
mergers and suggest alternative approaches of supervision.
" See Comment, Recent Developments in the Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 14
B.C. IND. & COM. L.J. 1252, 1258 (1973).
" See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974). The author of this article observed that: "Perhaps there is
no public policy left in Delaware corporate law except the objective of raising money."
But see Levine v. Biddle Sawyer Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. J 94,816 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 7, 1974). Although the district court held the complaint stated a cause of action
under Rule 10b-5, it did not dismiss the possibility that the merger involved may also
have violated fiduciary principles under Delaware corporate law.
" See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L. J. 663, 699-705 (1974) (imposition of federal fiduciary standards); Fleischer, Federal
Regulation of Internal Corporate Affairs, 29 Bus. LAW. 179, 184 (Special Issue 1974)
(possible federal chartering of corporations); Loomis, Greater Activism and Adaption
by the SEC, 29 Bus. LAW. 115 (Special Issue 1974) (expansion of SEC use of § 10(b)
antifraud provisions); Comment, Corenco v. Schiavone: The Cash Tender Offer as
Corporate Raider, 26 MAINE L. REv. 93 (1974) (federal protection of shareholders from
corporate raiding). For an early urging of a more active federal role in regulation of
corporations see Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (N.S.) 521 (1934).
4' See also Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd
on other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 43 U.S.L.W.
3209 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974), which held that in the absence of a valid business justifica-
tion a merger which eliminated minority interests was a scheme or device to defraud
and therefore a violation of Rule 10b-5. The Fifth Circuit did not rule on the Rule 10b-
5 cause of action. 490 F.2d at 570-71.
11 Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
